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“Je ne sais plus du tout qui je suis”: 
The Phenomenology of Cancer in Anne Cuneo’s Une cuillerée de bleu 
 
Steven Wilson and Sylvia Hübel  
 
AS MEDICAL PHILOSOPHER KAY TOOMBS has noted, modern clinical practice 
has, by convention, conceived of the body in mechanistic terms, implicitly emphasizing its 
debts to the Cartesian principle of the fundamental split between mind and body: “The 
traditional biomedical paradigm focuses exclusively on the body-as-machine, with a 
concurrent de-emphasis on the personhood of the patient and the reality and importance of the 
human experience of illness.”1 Georges Canguilhem, having traced the influence of Descartes’s 
dualistic archetype of embodiment back to the work of nineteenth-century physiologist Claude 
Bernard and sociologist Auguste Comte, is credited with being the first philosopher “who 
refutes in a convincing manner the biostatistical disease concept.”2 Championed by Christopher 
Boorse in the 1970s, this concept treated human beings as machines, and illness as the 
malfunctioning of bodily parts. Canguilhem developed instead “a view according to which 
health should be approached as an evaluative concept studied at the level of personal, clinical 
experience” (Svenaeus 67). A focus on subjectivity is particularly significant if we accept that, 
for the patient, illness is experienced first and foremost as “a disruption of [the] lived body” 
(Toombs 214), an interruption of the structures and patterns of everyday life, strained 
relationships within social and family networks, and altered perceptions of the world. Given 
that serious illness is usually unforeseen, and its diagnosis accompanied by feelings of shock, 
anxiety, and disbelief, health sociologist Michael Bury has characterised chronic forms of 
illness in particular as a “biographical disruption,” arguing that they interfere not only with our 
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general wellbeing but also with our identity, relationships, social life, and activities.3 By tracing 
the nature and production of knowledge to a subjective understanding of “the body,” this article 
will seek to shed light on the embodied experience of disease by adopting a phenomenological 
approach to the study of illness. It takes as its case study a relatively recent cancer 
autopathography, Anne Cuneo’s Une cuillerée de bleu (1979). Supported by a reading of the 
connection between meaning and the “lived body,” as theorised by French phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the article will consider how the experience of illness affects how the 
patient perceives her body, self, and world. It will propose that, in the case of Cuneo, who 
survived her cancer, autopathography gives expression to the subjective realities of illness and 
suffering as experienced by the perceiving body. In the course of our analysis, we will engage 
with the following overarching questions: if, as Schultz asserts, autopathographies are 
“phenomenological constructs,” in which “the compulsion to tell […] foreground[s] patients’ 
perceptions of altered body images and physiological processes,” what is the value of using 
phenomenology as a theory to be applied to autopathographical texts, and how can 
autopathography help us to illuminate phenomenological ideas?4 
 
 
Phenomenology: body as medium of perception 
Susan Sontag famously distinguishes between the “kingdom of the well” and the “kingdom of 
the sick” in her seminal essay Illness as Metaphor, stating that every human being holds “dual 
citizenship” and travels between these “kingdoms” as citizens of one or the other.5 Rejecting 
the binary of health versus illness, Havi Carel proposes that we should regard the two 
“kingdoms” of health and illness as connected rather than separate entities, suggesting that one 
of the certainties of human life is that we will enact a series of transitions from one “kingdom” 
to the other: “[We] require a shift in the way we think about health and illness. We need to 
move from seeing them as mutually exclusive opposites, towards a continuum or blend of the 
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two, allowing for health within illness in people who are objectively ill.”6 Carel’s argument for 
a change in perspective in how we approach health and illness serves as the premise for an 
injunction for a more fundamental break from the use of binary paradigms in medicine: 
 
A second shift is required, away from an objective deficit-centred health assessment 
towards giving more weight to subjective first-person reports or to lived experience. 
Both shifts are achieved by moving from a purely naturalistic view of health and illness 
to one that incorporates phenomenological insights. (Carel, Illness 93) 
 
In recent years, medical philosophers have made the case for a new conception of illness that 
stems from the principle that biological body and personhood are inextricably linked. This 
“alternative paradigm,” which “unites body and mind (or body and self) and situates body in 
the midst of the environing world,” encourages us to understand illness “not simply as the 
physical dysfunction of the mechanistic body, but as the disorder of body, self and world” 
(Toombs 202). A move away from a focus on physical facts – that is, an “objective (and 
objectifying), neutral and third-personal” view of illness which Carel labels the “naturalist” 
approach – and towards a conception of illness that takes account of lived experience, be it 
physical, psychological or social, invites us to consider illness through the lens of 
phenomenology (Carel, Illness 9-10). 
Eschewing an approach that centres on the physiological, phenomenology – “the 
science (logos) of relating consciousness to phenomena (things as they appear to us) rather than 
to pragmata (things as they are)” – offers a methodology that is particularly advantageous for 
an examination of illness.7 As Toombs writes, “Illness is experienced by the patient not so 
much as a specific breakdown in the mechanical functioning of the biological body, but more 
fundamentally as a disintegration of his ‘world’” (Toombs 207). In other words, illness is not 
4 
 
 
 
only an obstruction to health but also a phenomenon the patient lives through – one that disrupts 
the everyday experiences and interactions that give meaning and identity to the self. Privileging 
an analysis of first-person experience, phenomenology, as its founder Edmund Husserl put it, 
requires us to go back to “the things themselves,” in this case, the patient suffering from 
disease.8 This is not to say that a phenomenological approach to illness should supplant a 
naturalist one; rather, it allows us to complement specialist attention to biological dysfunction 
with an appreciation of the disruption this causes to the lived experience of the socially-
embedded human being, affording us a more complete understanding of patienthood, illness, 
and well-being. Thus, whereas Sontag declares that the aim of her analysis is not to describe 
“what it’s really like to emigrate to the kingdom of the ill and to live there” (Sontag 3), but 
rather to deal with some of the myths and superstitions that society and culture have constructed 
to describe illnesses such as tuberculosis and cancer, this article proposes to approach Cuneo’s 
autopathography from precisely the opposite direction, and to consider “what it’s really like” 
to be a cancer patient. 
Written between May 18 and November 10, 1978, and published the following year, 
Anne Cuneo’s breast cancer autopathography, Une cuillerée de bleu, subtitled “chronique 
d’une ablation,” is more than an autobiographical account of patienthood and pain. While it 
recounts medical visits, treatments – including chemotherapy – and a deep sense of suffering, 
it enjoys the privileged status of being recognized both for its literary merit and its use as a 
patient resource.9 Having survived her cancer, Cuneo informs us that “Des médecins ont donné 
le texte à leurs patients, pour les encourager à résister à la maladie, à se défendre. Il a été 
distribué dans les hôpitaux.”10 In spite of the fact that the text has been judged of value for 
patients enduring treatment for cancer, there has been a distinct paucity of critical focus on 
Cuneo’s autopathography until now. Isabelle Favre, almost alone in having devoted any 
significant attention to the text, examines the questions it raises in respect to the “rapports entre 
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la psyché et le corps.”11 Noting that Cuneo’s bodily experience shapes her written account – 
“l’écriture passe par le corps pour signifier” (Favre 250) – Favre traces the use of metaphorical, 
ideological, and mythical language in Cuneo’s account to a discernable sense of bodily 
alienation: “Avec Une cuillerée de bleu, on aborde l’analyse de la relation de l’individu à son 
corps qui lui échappe; la marginalisation débute par une aliénation de soi à soi, et se poursuivra 
par un sentiment de mise à l’écart, de distanciation du corps individuel au corps social” (Favre 
245). In turn, Favre argues that Cuneo “développe […] des stratégies textuelles qui l’aident à 
faire face à un coefficient d’adversité qui […] n’a rien de mythique” (Favre 252). By way of 
contrast, our analysis does not focus on Cuneo’s “textual strategies” for confronting cancer; 
rather, it examines the ways in which her writing communicates a sense of the lived experience 
of cancer. A brief discussion of the links between phenomenology, illness, and the perceiving 
body will provide a conceptual framework for doing so. 
As Martin Heidegger proposes in his phenomenology of the everyday in Sein und Zeit 
(1927), human experience is informed by a sense of in-der-Welt-sein (being-in-the-world): as 
this use of hyphens suggests, the self is to be regarded as imbricated in the world instead of 
existing in a subject/object relationship with it. While we experience our bodies, we also live 
through them, connecting to the environment around us in a synthesis that suggests the body is 
not, as Cartesian dualism would have it, merely something we inhabit. Merleau-Ponty also 
rejects a reductionist view of the body solely as physical entity – what he calls le corps objectif 
– in favour of a more complete understanding of the experience of the lived body – le corps 
propre.12 Articulating the unity of mind and body, Merleau-Ponty asserts that subjectivity is 
founded on the perceptual experience and sensual knowledge that are generated by interaction 
with the lived environment, stating, “le monde est non pas ce que je pense, mais ce que je vis” 
(Phénoménologie xii). Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology therefore “understands consciousness 
as not only embodied but also socially and existentially situated” (Carel, “Phenomenology as 
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a Resource for Patients” 100). The body “understands” and actively “inhabits” the world; it is 
the means by which, through the senses, we perceive the world.13 In Merleau-Ponty’s own 
words: 
 
Je suis donc mon corps, au moins dans toute la mesure où j’ai un acquis et 
réciproquement mon corps est comme un sujet naturel, comme une esquisse provisoire 
de mon être total. Ainsi l’expérience du corps propre s’oppose au mouvement réflexif 
qui dégage l’objet du sujet et le sujet de l’objet, et qui ne nous donne que la pensée du 
corps ou le corps en idée et non pas l’expérience du corps ou le corps en réalité. 
(Phénoménologie 231) 
 
If the body is neither truly subject nor object, the direct experience of the body is neither merely 
objective nor purely perceptual and subjective.14 Every experience involves our body as well 
as our mind; it is therefore never possible to divorce the materiality of the world from our 
existential condition, a principle that Merleau-Ponty frames using the concept of “intertwining” 
to describe the inseparability of the subject/self from the world.15 In so doing, he reclaims lived 
bodily experience as a source of knowledge, emphasizing that people make sense of the world 
through their bodies. As Toombs puts it, echoing some of the language used by Merleau-Ponty, 
“I am ‘embodied’ in the sense not that I ‘possess’ a body but in the sense that I AM my body. 
Rather than being an object of the world, my body is my particular point of view on the world” 
(Toombs 202). 
While the approaches of a range of phenomenologists from Husserl onwards lend 
themselves to a description of the embodied experience of illness, in which a writer such as 
Cuneo seeks to raise the question of the meaning of being ill, a state that in turn affects the 
phenomenal world – the life-world – of the individual, it is Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the 
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importance of perception that commends his work as a particularly instructive intertext in an 
analysis of the modern cancer autopathography.16 As illness disrupts the patient’s sense of 
being in the world, body and perception react, affecting movement, ability, and human 
existence as a whole. Mobility, which Merleau-Ponty construes as basic intentionality, thus 
becomes restricted, and one’s being in the world is inhibited as a consequence: “La conscience 
est l’être à la chose par l’intermédiaire du corps. […] [M]ouvoir son corps c’est viser à travers 
lui les choses” (Phénoménologie 161). As mobility is connected to Merleau-Ponty’s concept 
of the intentional arc, by which our relationship with the world is made up of time, environment 
and intentionality, and the body mediates our experience of the world, when a disease inflicts 
the body, illness manifests itself in its disruption to selfhood as well as bodily function: “C’est 
cet arc intentionnel qui fait l’unité des sens, celle des sens et de l’intelligence, celle de la 
sensibilité et de la motricité. C’est lui qui se ‘détend’ dans la maladie” (Phénoménologie 158). 
From a phenomenological point of view, illness is therefore not to be regarded as the result of 
bodily invasion by a reified organism; instead, as it becomes perceptibly embedded into one’s 
being, illness may be conceptualized as a “complete form of existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology 123). While the nature of illness is indeed existential, changing the shape of 
life for the sufferer, it is important to appreciate each patient’s individual experience of illness. 
Acknowledging that illness manifests itself in a variety of guises and experiences, 
phenomenologists have nonetheless grouped these into broad categories, including a 
consciousness of the body as alien “other,” and a subsequent dissolution in the unity of the 
“lived body”; a divorce between body and self, provoked by an objectification of the body 
(often as a result of the intervention of medical authority); and a sense of unfamiliarity with the 
world and insecurity in social relationships. These will now be considered in the context of 
Cuneo’s cancer autopathography. 
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Disruption, alienation, fragmentation  
Referring to a tiny amount of color that, when added to an artist’s palette, gives nuance, 
encourages a new perspective, and puts in place the conditions allowing for a reappraisal of a 
work-in-progress, the title of Cuneo’s autopathography is symbolic. In Une cuillerée de bleu, 
language communicates more than the corporeal dimension to illness; Cuneo’s cancer – “cette 
cuillerée de bleu en moi” (13) – is regarded as an invitation to reflect on broader questions 
concerning the sufferer’s life, identity, and fate. The three definitions of the keyword in the 
text’s subtitle, “ablation,” are to be considered in this context. Taken from the Robert 
dictionary, each serves as an epigraph to a section of the narrative: “Action d’enlever. Pratiquer 
l’ablation d’un rein”; “Perte de substance subie par un relief, pour quelque cause que ce soit. 
L’érosion est une sorte d’ablation”; “Perte de glace d’un glacier.” This attentiveness from the 
very beginning of Cuneo’s account to the expressive power of language, both literal and 
metaphoric, announces an intention not only to focus on the physicality of bodily alteration, 
but also to pose some thought-provoking questions with respect to what it feels like to be a 
“cancéreuse.” In The Illness Experience, Morse and Johnson distinguish between four stages 
in the experience of severe ailments and disorders.17 In the uncertainty period, when patients 
first discover their symptoms, they begin to lose faith in their bodily functionality. Following 
this, in the disruption stage, they face up to the need to relinquish control over themselves to 
healthcare providers, before seeking meaning and “striving to regain themselves” (Morse and 
Johnson 321). During the final stage, they attempt to retake control of their lives in a bid for 
recovery and closure. Even though Cuneo’s narrative makes reference to all the elements of 
this illness model, it aligns itself most closely with the disruption stage. 
While Cuneo’s autopathography deals with several months of her life after diagnosis 
and mastectomy, it does not follow a chronological order, with the result that it draws attention 
to the sense of incoherence and chaos produced by breast cancer. This chaotic order manifests 
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itself in her writing through a series of reflections on her shifting relationship with her body 
and, as a result, an unclear sense of her identity: “À partir du jour où tout a commencé, mon 
château est devenu sable que les flots peuvent à tout instant emporter” (70). As the metaphor 
of the sandcastle suggests, from the moment she enters the diagnostic process, Cuneo 
appreciates that all sense of security in her life is shattered. Recognizing that “C’est 
[l’incertitude] qui m’angoisse si fort, parfois” (9), and that “Le terrible de cette merde, c’est de 
ne pas savoir. Ne pas savoir si le cancer existe encore en moi ou non” (123), Cuneo takes 
cognizance of her loss of control over her body. The framing of cancer as an objectified entity 
living in the body causes her relationship with her body to undergo a subtle shift. This shift is 
emphasized in the use of demonstrative adjectives when referring to bodily parts – for example, 
“cet uterus” (117) – or, more generally, when she writes of “Ce corps sans sein auquel je n’ose 
penser” 90). This formal technique draws attention to Cuneo’s unstable and problematic 
relationship with the idea of the “lived body” she has known and experienced until now; the 
result is that she places distances between her self and her body: “Ce corps que les siècles ont 
façonné, ce corps dont ma mère a accouché, ce corps que j’ai nourri, animé – ce corps dans 
lequel je me suis blottie comment, aujourd’hui, le préserver? Muet et bruyant, il se manifeste 
à moi dans une douleur assourdissante” (69). 
Cuneo’s subsequent mastectomy, which she experiences as a violation of corporeal 
boundaries and a reshaping of her body, affects her sense of physical integrity: describing 
herself as a “prisonnière d’une carcasse que je ne contrôle pas,” she writes of waiting for the 
consultant gynaecologist to arrive and tell her “où sont mes frontières” (110). This sense of 
alienation, bodily disunity, and uncertain identity caused by her treatment is reflected in the 
duality Cuneo perceives between her diseased body and her healthy mind: “Dans le taxi, mon 
cerveau continue à fonctionner dans une direction et mon corps dans l’autre” (113). This 
experience fits with ethicist Margaret Farley’s argument that we are all “natural dualists,” 
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unaware of our bodies until they cease to function ‘normally.’ Through pleasure or pain, Farley 
argues, we adopt a dualistic stance, whereby we consciously distance ourselves from what we 
perceive as our failing body.18 In Une cuillerée de bleu, this distancing is revealed when Cuneo 
recalls feeling alienated from her body: “C’est cette impression d’être peu à peu dépouillée de 
mon corps, dépossédée de tout mon destin, de mon temps” (117). This response, in turn, 
provokes a crisis in her experience as an embodied self, her pain-ridden body alienating her 
from her familiar world and other people: “Je pose sur le monde un œil différent, complètement 
détaché: je vais mourir, il n’y a plus de place en moi pour la peur de vivre” (97). 
Cuneo’s approach to her body reminds us that the concept of the embodied subject is 
central to autopathography, as only first-person knowledge can inform us about what it is like 
to inhabit a body during illness and medical treatments. Autopathographies, particularly those 
that privilege a phenomenological description of individual experience, thus have the potential 
to reveal much more about the experience of illness than sociological, scientific or medical 
narratives on their own. As Cuneo begins to contemplate the disintegration of her body caused 
by a mastectomy, and its subsequent effects on her sense of identity, entries in her 
autopathography appropriate a discourse of fragmentation: she thinks of herself as a “moi 
mutilée” (21) and states that she would prefer “plutôt la mort que cette mutilation” (23). The 
vociferous quality of the language used to describe the fears she experiences concerning the 
fragmentation of her body corresponds to a heightened sensitivity to the effects of treatment on 
her sense of gender identity in particular. Cuneo experiences her mastectomy as an attack on 
her feminine self, insisting the removal of corporeal signs of femininity and female sexuality 
will render her incomplete: “C’est la condamnation à mort de ma vie de femme que vous 
prononcez là. […] Qu’on m’enlève ce sein, et je n’existerai plus” (22). Her experience of breast 
cancer is arguably felt most profoundly in the fear that she will lose the affection of her partner, 
Eric: “Quand on m’aura enlevé un sein, je ne serai plus une femme. Comment va-t-il encore 
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m’aimer? Cette souffrance-là par-dessus l’autre” (32). Cuneo makes this point repeatedly in 
her autopathography, revealing that the fragmentation of a supportive relationship – articulated 
in the narrative fragmentation of the text, the framing of “je” and “lui” in opposition to each 
other, and the posing of open questions – troubles her more than bodily dismemberment per 
se: 
 
Il marche vers la porte. 
Je le regarde. 
Je l’aime. 
Et lui, comment m’aimera-t-il, à demi mutilée? 
Sans identité? 
[…] À la porte, il se tourne, il me regarde, il me sourit. 
Des yeux, j’essaie de l’imprimer en moi. Mon amour. 
Il me quittera. 
Je serai seule. 
Au secours. (42) 
 
Medicalization and objectification: resistance and repair 
Une cuillerée be bleu offers an insight into the process through which medical authority takes 
control of the patient’s body and life, in line with medical sociologist Arthur Frank’s 
description of medical interventions as a form of colonization, whereby doctors claim the body 
of the patient as their “territory” and assume power over them.19 From the moment of 
hospitalization, Cuneo, subjected to what Foucault refers to in Naissance de la clinique as the 
“medical gaze” (“Œil qui sait et qui décide, œil qui régit”),20 as well as the physical touching 
and prodding of healthcare providers, relinquishes her privacy and control of her intimate 
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bodily space, causing feelings of depersonalization and objectification. When she presents for 
her first medical appointment, Cuneo feels anatomized and thinks of her body as a site of 
diagnostic and treatment interventions: “On me lave. On refait mon lit. On emmène la 
transfusion et la perfusion. On me lève. On me soutient jusqu’aux toilettes” (57). The language 
used in this quotation to describe the asymmetry of the doctor-patient relationship draws 
attention to the limited autonomy of the patient subordinated to the control of medical practice. 
Medical authority is rendered in the anonymous subject pronoun “on” – the active agent each 
time – while the passive patient, reduced to her ill-functioning body parts, linguistically 
inhabits the place of the object pronoun. Through its emphasis on the objectifying stance and 
discourse of medicine, Cuneo’s authopathography contests the practice of “medicalization” by 
relating an abundance of specialist medical terms such as “transfusion” and “perfusion” used 
to describe her condition, as well as the ways in which she feels that she is compelled to submit 
her body to medical authority.21 Yet Cuneo’s reflections on the power dynamic in doctor-
patient interactions prompt an important change in her approach to medical discussions about 
her body. A few months before diagnosis, when she seeks medical help because of some 
suspicious symptoms, her personal knowledge of her body and its functioning is dismissed by 
the doctor. This event triggers feelings of anger, frustration, as well as objectification in her: 
“La gynécologue m’a dit que mon sein droit était normal. Elle est médecin, donc elle le sait. 
Merde! C’est MOI qui savais. Moi. Sur une intuition qu’aucune pensée rationnelle ne pouvait 
justifier (je n’avais même pas mal)” (126). The tension between personal and medical 
knowledge manifested in this quotation, and the rhetorical and stylistic rendering of the 
narrative – through the effects of repetition, capitalisation, and the use of irony – testify to an 
unwillingness to permit experiential testimony to be usurped by the voice of supposed medical 
expertise. 
Although Cuneo records not being taken seriously as a knowing subject and, by 
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extension, as a valid source of knowledge, she is nonetheless keenly aware of her 
epistemological relationship with her body and her possession of knowledge that medical staff 
do not hold. Indeed, at one point she writes of her guilt about failing her body because she 
ignored warning signs communicated through dreams and bodily “intuition”: 
 
Ces rêves prémonitoires, ces intuitions qui m’ont fait pressentir à certains instants 
l’évidence même, je les ai niés car ils venaient d’ailleurs que du pur raisonnement. Ma 
nature ‘suiveuse’ m’a poussée à me fier au seul domaine qui ait droit de cité dans cette 
société: celui de la raison pragmatique. (135) 
 
As a consequence, Cuneo turns away from her earlier identification with positivist thinking 
and rationality, and she begins to place more faith in bodily knowledge based on feelings and 
intuitions. She rejects the dichotomy between her intellect and emotions, between medical 
evidence and her subjective bodily knowledge; instead, she pays attention to the sensations of 
her body and the messages of her subconscious, attentive to the fact that bodily awareness and 
experience in themselves constitute forms of knowledge. The value Cuneo places on the body 
as a medium of perception is significant in three respects: it situates her narrative production 
within the conceptual parameters of phenomenology, particularly Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion 
that the body functions as a medium of perception; it allows her to challenge expressions of 
medical authority that do not take sufficient account of bodily experience; and it echoes 
feminist critiques – espoused, for example, by Schultz – that argue that medical practice often 
patronizes female patients in particular by overriding with expert knowledge their tendency to 
offer experiential accounts. Within this context, it is apposite to note that Cuneo records on one 
occasion the sense of empowerment that comes when one particular doctor – a woman – takes 
the time to listen to her experience and involve her in the decision-making process, treating her 
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as an equal and respecting her subjectivity: “Elle réussit à me donner la sensation que je suis 
une partenaire, et non une victime totale. Elle est la première, d’ailleurs, à me parler d’adulte à 
adulte, à me dire les choses clairement” (88). This observation is symptomatic of a yearning 
that is evident throughout Une cuillerée de bleu for a holistic and patient-centered approach to 
the treatment of illness.  
Before the advent of advanced medical technology, patients’ personal reports 
represented the primary source of information enabling doctors to make a diagnosis. However, 
with the development of medical sciences, the voices of the physician and patient were placed 
in opposition to each other, which established dichotomies between objectivity and 
subjectivity, and relevant and irrelevant knowledge. Cuneo’s reflections serve as a reminder 
that autopathography has the potential to challenge the authoritarian, patriarchal assumptions 
that govern the patient-doctor relationship. As Frank has argued, autopathographies are not just 
stories about illness; they are also told through wounded bodies, including the voice. Whereas 
“medicine takes away voice,” autopathographies release the patient’s voice from professional 
medical containment, so that “telling stories of illness is the attempt, instigated by the body’s 
disease, to give a voice to an experience that medicine cannot describe” (Frank 7, 18). 
Corroborating Frank’s assertion that storytelling is an empowering vehicle in which patients’ 
bodies “give their stories their particular shape and direction” (Frank 27), Cuneo notes that it 
is through the act of writing that she is able to forge a creative path towards regaining agency: 
 
Les cloches de midi au clocher carillonnent que j’ai raison. Que si la parole est mon 
salut, si l’écriture est ma plénitude, il faut parler, écrire. 
Aimer et écrire. Écrire et militer. Militer et aimer. 
Aimer en militant et en écrivant. 
Voilà mes axes vitaux. (25-26) 
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The parallels Cuneo establishes between the verbs “écrire” and “militer” in this quotation evoke 
Avrahami’s argument that “the felt tension between empowerment and powerlessness points 
to the invasion of the text by the sick body.”22 Unlike the traditional use of “battle metaphors” 
in modern cancer narratives, the use of military discourse in Cuneo’s autopathography suggests 
that she regards her text as a site for resistance on which the lived body negotiates with medical 
power, through the act of writing, in a bid to restore the subjectivity – and thus the voice – of 
the patient. In this way, Une cuillerée de bleu exemplifies Foucault’s notion of the genealogy 
of power relations in a medical context, encapsulated in his now famous remark “Là où il y a 
pouvoir, il y a résistance.”23 Cuneo’s “resistance” is evident in the strident tone of some 
sections of her autopathography, including the following excerpt in which her “moi nouveau” 
is positioned in contradistinction to the medical “il,” and the emphatic pronoun “toi” is placed 
in opposition to “les autres [médecins]”: 
 
Ce moi nouveau, récemment accouché, qui criait il y a quelques semaines: “Je serai 
celle-ci ou je ne serai plus,” ce moi nouveau se dresse malgré l’interdit. Il dit non. Finis 
les silences. Finies les larmes qu’on ravale. Tu hurleras en plein jour. Les autres 
s’intéresseront à tes cris ou non – ce n’est pas ton problème, c’est le leur. Toi, tu dois 
vomir ta vie de muette jusqu’à la dernière cellule pourrie. (24) 
 
For all the sense of fragmentation and struggle that characterizes Cuneo’s autopathography, the 
writing process, which tells of her shifting relationship with her body and her broken 
connections to the world, allows her to translate her experience of cancer into words. Cuneo 
thereby manages to forge new connections to new worlds by entering into dialogue with her 
body of readers. Relating the experience of what it is to be a cancer patient, in a postface to her 
16 
 
 
 
autopathography dated April 2004, she recounts having received “des centaines de lettres” from 
both male and female cancer patients declaring that her inspirational combative attitude “leur 
avai[t] sauvé la vié” (169). As Frank suggests, “as wounded, people may be cared for, but as 
storytellers, they care for others” (Frank xii). Nonetheless, by telling the story of her illness 
and reclaiming her embodied experience through the writing process, Cuneo is also searching 
for meaning, a quest that enables her to reestablish herself as a knowing female subject with 
epistemological, moral, and political agency. The act of writing an autopathography may 
therefore be seen as playing a significant role in the reconstruction of Cuneo’s post-mastectomy 
identity; as such, Une cuillerée de bleu might also be read within the conceptual framework of 
the idea of “narrative repair.” As Hilde Lindemann Nelson has persuasively argued, if identities 
can be “narratively constituted” and “narratively injured,” they can also be “narratively 
repaired” in the sense that the writing process provides the potential to enable the author to 
construct a new self.24 Cuneo’s emotional dedication to writing about her experiences – “La 
rage remonte. Et avec la rage l’écriture. Une fois la peur surmontée, d’ailleurs, les mots se 
pressent. Ça sort comme un vomissement” (40) – provides not simply an outlet, but also a 
constructive framework in which she can regain an agency that has been ignored or 
misrepresented by the dominance of medical culture, and renegotiate medicine’s discursive 
management of her illness. Writing, for Cuneo, thus represents more than an attempt to 
understand her experience of cancer; in the zeal with which she writes, a new identity as 
patient-writer is affirmed: “Je ne laisserai pas s’arrêter maintenant cette plume trempée de sang 
et perclue de douleurs. Mon moi le plus authentique est-il un moi écrivant?” (70). The 
construction of a narrative supports the cognitive restructuring of Cuneo’s lived reality, 
allowing her to integrate her experience of illness into a newly constructed identity.25  
 
Conclusion: autopathography as phenomenology 
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Une cuillerée de bleu gives us a perceptive insight into the life-world of a cancer patient. 
Exploring questions of bodily alienation and fragmentation, as well as the passivity of 
patienthood, all of which result from the experience of illness, a reading of Cuneo’s 
autopathography through the lens of phenomenology reminds us that the suffering subject – 
dehumanized by an objectification that characterizes the clinical encounter – perceives illness 
first and foremost in terms of the disruption caused to the lived body. While the physician may 
approach illness as a biological dysfunction requiring medical intervention, Cuneo expresses 
in blunt, existential terms her difficulty in coming to terms with the physical, psychological, 
and emotional realities of illness: “Je souffre affreusement. Je ne sais plus du tout qui je suis” 
(139). Through its phenomenological depiction of embodied experience, Cuneo’s 
autopathography offers a rich contribution to the understanding of what it is to be a cancer 
patient. Furthermore, given that it paints a picture of a patient who actively resists the power 
of medical authority, it also contributes to the cultural paradigm shift that has seen patients 
change in recent years from passive figures and recipients of care to active agents 
communicating and offering embodied knowledge within the framework of “patient-centred 
care.” In Une cuillerée de bleu, we witness the rise of an empowered patient who promotes an 
understanding of the medical value of lived experience and whose first-person narrative plays 
its role as a patient resource in a community of sufferers, all of which helps to dismantle the 
taboo surrounding conversations about breast cancer. 
In her autopathography, Cuneo paints an intimate portrait of the cancer patient as an 
embodied, relational subject, embedded in a particular life context. In this way, we should not 
simply read Une cuillerée de bleu within the critical framework of phenomenology, 
illuminating as that is. Instead, following Svenaeus’s argument that “Phenomenology is meant 
to enrich our understanding of health in adding to the disease-level analysis a level of analysis 
that addresses the questions of how the physiological states are lived as meaningful in an 
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environment” (Svenaeus 105), it is apposite that we should identify Une cuillerée de bleu as a 
phenomenological text, depicting experiences in terms of the patient’s thoughts, feelings, and 
bodily sensations, and giving voice to the experience of living with cancer. In this way, Cuneo’s 
narrative also offers an outline of potential benefits of the “new model” of medicine advocated 
by Schwartz and Wiggins, in which the scientific rigor that is the underpinning of medical 
practice allies itself with an appreciation of “the primacy of the lifeworld” of the patient.26 
Schwartz and Wiggins argue that this new paradigm, which they term a “phenomenological 
model of medicine,” provides an opportunity to heal the debilitating breech that has opened up 
in recent decades between the medical sciences and the humanities (Schwartz and Wiggins 
359). A reading of Cuneo’s cancer narrative through the lens of phenomenology affirms that 
autopathography, by offering an enriching understanding of the embodied experience of “what 
it is like” to be ill, has a pivotal role to play in this endeavor. 
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